These three works explain how the post–World War II international order emerged and why it proved relatively stable.
In Ikenberry (1989), the central argument is that hegemony can become institutionalized and “invited.” Rather than relying only on coercion, the United States embedded its power within institutions and rules that other states accepted because they made the system more predictable and beneficial. ⭐ By agreeing to certain constraints and creating cooperative frameworks, the U.S. was able to lead a system that other countries were willing to join.
In Ikenberry (1992), the focus shifts to how ideas and policy networks helped shape the postwar order. Experts, policymakers, and economists developed the concept of embedded liberalism, which combined open international markets with domestic protections such as welfare states and economic regulation. ⭐ These ideas helped guide the construction of institutions like the IMF and World Bank and shaped how globalization would operate after the war.
In Maier (1977), the emphasis is on the domestic political foundations of this system. Maier argues that governments built a “politics of productivity,” where economic growth, labor protections, and state intervention were used to reduce class conflict and stabilize democracy. Foreign policy and international cooperation reinforced this domestic settlement.
Together, these works show that the postwar international order was not just the result of American power. It emerged from domestic political compromises within states that were then institutionalized internationally, creating a stable system that connected internal economic management with global cooperation. ⭐
✅ One-sentence takeaway
Ikenberry argues that American hegemony after WWII did not emerge simply because the U.S. was powerful, but because allies invited U.S. leadership and policymakers built a negotiated institutional order—embedded liberalism—that balanced global economic openness with domestic economic stability.