This article examines New York City’s campaign finance system as a real-world test of whether small-donor public financing can reshape political influence.
The authors argue that, while courts limit direct restrictions on political spending, governments can still promote democratic equality by incentivizing small donations.
Using empirical data from NYC elections since 1997, the study finds that matching funds significantly increase both the number and importance of small donors, making campaign financing more representative of the population. It also models how similar systems could function at the state level, concluding that participation-based public financing can meaningfully shift political dependence away from large donors without violating constitutional constraints.
The paper’s overall argument comes together around a single idea: since limiting political spending is constitutionally constrained, reform should focus on building up participation instead of restricting money.
Matching funds follow a clear chain:
Because of this, the system becomes more representative without violating free speech principles.
The final takeaway is simple: Campaign finance reform is most effective when it expands who participates, rather than trying to limit how much is spent