Having immigration courts in DOJ and ICE in DHS creates both structural tension and necessary separation: ICE decides whom to charge and detain from within DHS, while DOJ‑run courts (EOIR) adjudicate those cases under the Attorney General’s policy control, with coordination largely managed through docketing, data‑sharing, and enforcement priorities.[1][2]
Structural harmony and conflict
Backlog and case volume
Processing times and completion metrics
Outcomes: removals, relief, and terminations
Current backlog and enforcement‑court dynamics
There is very little mainstream policy analysis that specifically models “what if ICE were moved under DOJ,” but there is a substantial body of research critiquing the current DHS–DOJ split and proposing structural alternatives that imply what such a move would aim to fix or could worsen.[1][2]
What the literature actually proposes
How scholars implicitly view a DOJ‑ICE model
Structural alternatives that point the other way
Any measurable projections?
- Existing quantitative work (backlog growth, completion times, removal/termination rates) measures the effects of the current split, not counterfactual scenarios with ICE under DOJ.[7][8][2]
- Reports that model reforms with numbers (e.g., adding judges, triaging dockets, changing prosecutorial discretion) assume:
- EOIR remains in DOJ or becomes Article I;
- ICE stays in DHS but changes how many Notices to Appear it files and which cases it pursues.[9][2]
- There are no widely cited empirical simulations that estimate, for example, “if ICE were in DOJ, backlog would change by X% or removal rates by Y.” The consensus issues identified—backlog, processing times, and perceived bias—are generally attributed to:
- EOIR’s placement within DOJ;
- ICE’s filing and detention policies within DHS;
- Under‑resourcing and political interference, rather than simply the cross‑departmental split.[7][2][1]
How to think about the hypothetical
Drawing from this literature, the most defensible expectations if ICE were moved into DOJ are:
- Likely increases in perceived and real conflict of interest:
- The same Cabinet officer (AG) would oversee both the prosecuting agency (ICE) and the immigration courts, intensifying concerns already raised about DOJ’s dual role.[3][1]
- Unclear gains in efficiency:
- Backlog research stresses that the main drivers are filing volume, judge resources, and docket management, not the DHS–DOJ divide itself; moving ICE would not automatically change those inputs.[8][7]